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25 September 1959

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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25 September 1959

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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK  
Communist China - USSR: Peiping's domestic propaganda continues to reflect a degree of opposition to Moscow's more moderate approach to the United States. An article in the current issue of the Chinese theoretical journal Red Flag implicitly criticizes Moscow by attacking "Chinese bourgeois elements" who had been reluctant to continue "sharp struggles against US imperialism" and by condemning the "heinous US aggressor" as a threat that must be destroyed. The article reaffirms Peiping's determination eventually to "liberate" Taiwan, but it does not threaten immediate action.

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OK  
Communist bloc - Guinea: Continuing efforts by the Communist bloc to cater to Guinea's desire for international status and to establish close political and economic ties were reflected in the speeches and display of friendship by the bloc delegates at the recent congress of President Sekou Touré's Democratic party--Guinea's only political party. The absence of Western delegates enabled the specially invited bloc delegations to further the impression that achievements by the Touré regime during Guinea's first year of independence have been largely due to bloc assistance.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Laos:

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The Laotian

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(Government's mounting dissatisfaction with the French is reflected in Premier Phoui's bitter complaints about France's attitude and the "do nothing" performance of French military advisers with the Laotian Army)

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(\*The Laotian Army commander may have taken the first step in a plan to redeploy some units from Sam Neua Province to Luang Prabang in the belief that the rebels may shift their operations from the border areas to the Laotian interior. According to late press reports, the airlift of a paratroop battalion from Sam Neua to Luang Prabang now is in progress.)

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Japan: Japanese Prime Minister Kishi has warned factional leaders in his Liberal-Democratic party that he will dissolve the Diet if the party cannot agree on terms for revising the US-Japan Security Treaty. Recent attempts by anti-Kishi conservative leaders to undermine Kishi on the treaty issue have not succeeded, but the treaty question has been revived following the visit of former

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DAILY BRIEF

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Japanese Prime Minister Ishibashi to Peiping. Ishibashi agreed with the Chinese leaders that the treaty is an impediment to closer Sino-Japanese relations. Kishi apparently is confident that the financial strain of an election and the probability that the electorate would support him on the treaty will keep his party in line.

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### III. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

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Outlook for Afghanistan. NIE 53-59. 22 Sept 59. [REDACTED]

Situation in Laos. SNIE 68-2-59. 18 Sept 59. [REDACTED]

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Peiping Concerned Over Implications of Current Soviet Policy

An article in the mid-September issue of Red Flag, top Chinese Communist theoretical journal, provides further indication that Peiping is concerned over Moscow's current posture on relaxation of international tension, symbolized by the exchange of visits with President Eisenhower. Peiping probably fears Chinese objectives in both foreign and domestic policies will be undercut. The Red Flag article demonstrates the high value the Chinese Communists place on using the threat of US "aggression" to goad their people into ever greater efforts toward internal development. The article implicitly criticizes Soviet policy by attacking "Chinese elements of the bourgeoisie" who were afraid of sharp and continued "struggle" to destroy imperialism.

Warning the Chinese against using any signs of improved Soviet-American relations as an excuse to relax, the article states, "Face to face with the US aggressor, the Chinese people are forced to intensify their work and build economically backward China into an advanced, industrialized, and socialist power." Red Flag cited Peiping's action in the Korean hostilities as an example of how to defeat "imperialism" with "sharp struggle," pointing out the internal progress made as a result of the attendant "despise America" campaign.

The condemnation of the US as a "heinous aggressor" incapable of "repenting" suggests the Chinese are convinced that unremitting political opposition to the United States is the only means of reducing US influence in the Far East. Red Flag reaffirmed Peiping's determination eventually to "liberate" Taiwan, but it made no threat of immediate action. The article suggested "liberation" might be "detoured" for some time, as the US was still a "real tiger" capable of inflicting injury.

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Soviet Bloc Delegates Prominent at Guinea Congress

Delegations from the USSR, Eastern European countries, and the French Communist party were particularly prominent at the annual congress of President Sekou Touré's Democratic party which was held in Conakry during mid-September. The "especially invited" delegations attempted through speeches and displays of "friendship" to strengthen the bloc's recent economic and political gains in Guinea and to further bloc influence in other African states. Efforts to consolidate the impression that achievements during the Touré regime's first year of independence have been largely due to assistance from the bloc were facilitated by the absence of Western delegates. Most of the independent African states were represented, but invitations apparently were not extended to Western countries.

The American Embassy in Conakry believes that the invitations--a departure from Guinea's professed policy of neutrality--resulted from Touré's gratitude for aid from bloc countries, as well as adroit maneuvering by the bloc. The UAR ambassador to Guinea expressed serious concern to US officials in early September over the degree of influence the bloc had attained there.

A Guinean Foreign Ministry official recently stated that Communist China may establish an embassy in Conakry before the end of 1959. The USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria now have diplomatic missions in Guinea.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

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(Joint efforts by the West to strengthen Laos against the threat of a Communist take-over have for some time been hampered by the widening gulf between the Phoui Sananikone government and French representatives in Laos. The situation has been aggravated by the openly skeptical attitude taken by the French toward Laotian Army reports on the fighting and on the degree of North Vietnamese involvement, and by the French tendency to blame Phoui and his colleagues for the current crisis)

(Overriding concern with East-West relations generally and with developments in Algeria have all but eliminated high-level French comment on the Laotian situation. Paris apparently accepts French Ambassador Gassouin's analysis of internal political difficulties in Laos and his denial of evidence of real foreign military intervention, but does not comprehend the extent to which French-Laotian relations have deteriorated. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, however, recently said that Gassouin would be replaced by the end of the year in what may be an attempt to remove one of the major causes of friction)

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### Kishi Calls for Conservative Unity on US-Japan Security Treaty Revision

Japanese Prime Minister Kishi has warned factional leaders in his Liberal Democratic party (LDP) that he will dissolve the Diet and call a parliamentary election unless they maintain unity on terms for revising the US-Japan Security Treaty.

Kishi, well aware that rivals within the party would like to unseat him by undermining his position on a major policy issue, is attempting to minimize the effect of a joint communiqué issued in Peiping by former Japanese Prime Minister Ishibashi and Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai. Ishibashi agreed with Peiping leaders that the security treaty is an impediment to closer Sino-Japanese relations.

The revised security treaty is still under negotiation, but it is expected to be submitted to the Diet for ratification sometime after the regular session convenes in December. Kishi said he would proceed with the Diet deliberations even if the Socialists boycott the proceedings, but he probably is concerned over a possible conservative split and coalition with the Socialists which could block ratification.

Kishi told the LDP leaders that Japan "stands at a crossroads between neutralism and freedom and must clearly align itself on the side of the free world." He said he would take full responsibility for unifying public and party opinion and would not hesitate to stake his political life on ratification. Kishi apparently is confident that the financial strain of an election and the probability that the electorate would endorse him on the treaty issue will keep his party in line.

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

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